Wednesday, May 6, 2015

Dialogue and Difference: Epistemologies

In the following posts, I am going to discuss some issues related to our knowledge, imagination, and rationality, etc., and relate them to the prospect of connecting with others with different viewpoints. (I may not have all my references written down because I am copying and pasting from my journals, and the process does not include footnotes).

I do not believe that foundationalist epistemology is helpful for a critical realism perspective. I think of knowing is more embedded ion structures of learning. Since foundationalism seems resistant to learning, it is not a helpful philoslophy of knowledge.

a. Critical Realism and Difference


When you encounter a perspective that is in conflict with your own (a disagreement!), two options may present themselves. Either you can assume that your own perspective is dominant and so determines the conclusion of the conflict, or you can assume that the two perspectives cannot find a common ground, either because they are so entrenched in their own contexts or because they refer to two separate realities; they are incommensurable. The difference of perspectives may be of religious traditions, political views,scientific research programs, or between religious practitioners and scientists. Both of these options are ways of attending to difference and both are problematic.


Neither of these options exemplifies critical realism. Realism is the belief that there is a reality, specifically a reality that has existential precedence over the content of human thought. That is,that there is a reality “outside the mind”, as it were. What makes a realismcritical is how the mind relates to that reality. For instance, naïve realism suggests that what is real is readily available to the mind, and what the mind perceives is literally an exact impression of what is real. A critical realism accounts for the fallibility of human knowing. That is, what is real is not always obvious and knowing involves attending to the limitations of human epistemic resources. A simple reason as to why the first option does not entail critical realism is because it does not take seriously the limitations of human knowledge. A simple reason the second option does not exemplify critical realism is because it does not take seriously that reality is one and takes precedence over thought. A more profound reason why each option does not represent a critical realism is that both do not take seriously that each perspective is conditioned by that which is beyond it. That is, there may be something novel (a concept or a piece of information) that lies outside your perspective that has implications for your beliefs. The mistaken assumption is that one's own beliefs cannot be modified or informed by an outside alternative resource;that is, that one's own epistemic resources are enough. Both the absolutism of the first option and the relativism of the second option are subject to a naïve realism because they don't consider the importance of learning from beyond one's immediate perspective.


Therefore,is a third option is presented. That is the option of a critical engagement with the different and the new. One need not assume that one perspective will consume the other, nor that they should be isolated from each other, but rather they can coexist and create a new perspectivism through dialogue. Of course it's not that simple. However, we should thematize the challenge of navigating through difference in this society by attending to tendencies of naïve realism. The only way to reduce the threatening presence of alternative perspectives is make meaningful dialogue.

I am going to consider insights from philosophical theologians that address the epistemic challenges in the dialogue between science and theology. Then I'm going to look at an example of a controversy from within evangelical theology. I'm going to assume that the insights and examples I use are interesting and useful to nonreligious persons as well.

b. Postfoundationalism


I will draw insights from a number of theologians who recognize that,in order to meet the challenge of facilitating an interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the sciences, they must first address the postmodern challenge of maintaining the conviction of the unity of truth while navigating through multiple perspectives. I am mainly following the lead of philosophical theologian J. Wenzel vanHuyssteen, whose solution is to propose a postfoundationalist epistemology. Postfoundationalism is a mediating solution to the antithetical positions of foundationalism and nonfoundationalism.  We will first need to explain each of these positions.


Foundationalism “insists that there is some way to ground all human knowledge in a set of objective, self-evident beliefs which then supports a universal understanding of rationality where reason remains invariant across every context.”1 Foundationalism is present when knowledge-claims are assumed to be certain and universal. Foundationalism is found in the assumption that certain content of knowledge excuses people from learning from or being informed by alternative perspectives. A reaction to this view is nonfoundationalism, which “highlights the fact that every historical context, and every cultural or social group, has its own distinct rationality. This kind of contextualism easily leads to a relativism of rationalities, where every social or human activity could in principle function as a framework for human rationality.”2 Theologian F. Leron Shults summarizes this way:


Foundationalism,in the “classical” sense, was a part of the Enlightenment project: human reason could attain certain knowledge based oneself-evident foundational experiences or a priori propositions,from which necessary and universal conclusions could be reached. Absolutism guides the definition of Reason (and so the drive for systematicity). Nonfoundationalism is diametrically opposed to this approach, asserting that we have no foundational beliefs that are independent of the support of other beliefs; rather, we subsist in a groundless web, attempting merely to maintain coherence in our local praxis. Justifying beliefs is only a matter of determining whether they cohere with the other beliefs in a particular web or context. Relativism often shapes the view of reason (and so also of the ideal ofsystematicity).3

Postfoundationalismis a third option that tries to find a way between foundationalismand nonfoundationalism. “Postfoundationalismattempts to split the difference between foundationalism and nonfoundationalism by affirming the epistemic importance of making responsible judgments characteristic of the former while acknowledging the ineluctable contextuality of interpreted experience emphasized by the latter.”4 Philosophical theologian J. Wenzel van Huyssteen proposes a postfoundational theory of rationality by focusing on real life accounts of belief formation. Van Huyssteen argues that the human species universally shares resources that attribute to belief formation, including seeking intelligibility with problem-solving abilities and intersubjective accountability. Van Huyssteen also argues for a transversal rationality – that is, for rationality that is exemplified by shared concerns and practices among various disciplines. In this way, van Huyssteen attends to the interpretive aspects of knowing.


In general, I would argue that we should attempt to uphold the integrity of rationality within various contexts (for instance, differing disciplines or differing religious systems) while also finding connectivity with cross-contextual rationality – attending to the integrity and limitations of each perspective. In order to uphold a critical realism, we should have attitudes of learning rather than judgment as we seek understanding.

c.  Biblical Theology and History


I’m going to borrow an example from within evangelical theology. Suppose there is a body of scholarship that recognizes the need to interpret the New Testament text in terms of historical scholarship. Suppose also that there is a school of thought that suggests that historical scholarship should not inform one’s interpretation of scripture because scripture itself is an epistemic foundation and hence cannot or should not be informed by “outside” sources. The question is then begged: What is the relationship between history and biblical theology? Does one of these two spheres determine the conclusions in the other? Does one perspective dominates the other. Should the bible-believing Christian assume the bible determines closure on all differences or tensions found in historical scholarship? (Similarly,should the supposed neutral secular scholarship determine the conclusions of the former?). Or perhaps we should conclude that history and theology are simply two different disciplines that should not account for the other; they are incommensurable spheres too deeply entrenched in their own contexts. Each of these options are problematic. In the first option, the Christian (or the historian)is a foundationalist, assuming that certain content of knowledge excuses her from the prospect of being informed by an alternative perspective, that such knowledge is immune to correction or adjustment. The second option is a nonfoudnationalism, assuming that each perspective is so deeply contextual that they cannot find common ground. Therefore a postfoundationalist approach should be recommended where the Christian can attend to connectivity of history and theology. I would not assume that this is easy. In fact, I suspect that part of the real problem behind these differences is the rigor involved in mediating positions.

d.  Learning and Judging


In conclusion, I would like to propose the challenge of the assumption of foundationalism. The assumption that a given source of knowledge excuses one from further learning, or the assumption that one cannot be informed by further study. These assumptions constitute a naïve realism. On the other hand, we should be careful not to assume something to be irrelevant to our own context. One should take seriously the notion that we are conditioned by that which is beyond us. In which case I think a fair starting point is to assume that we can all learn from each other.

When one encounters something that is new or different, one has a choice. One can either interpret the new and the different in terms of their already present tacit categories, or one can reconfigure one's categories in their engagement with what is new or different. The first response can be referred to as “judging”, the second as“learning.” This reveals an important aspect of engaging with different perspectives – that the engagement would be an opportunity to learn and involves introspection. Hence,introspection and dialogue go together.

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